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Ryan A. Tyz*
Searching for a Corporate Liability
Standard Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act in Doe v. Unocal
The documents we celebrate this week—the Bill of Rights, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the more recent
Helsinki accords—derive their value and promise from the
timeless, immutable truths they contain and our solemn com-
mitment to upholding them.  As we reflect on the historic sig-
nificance of these documents, let us vow to ensure that they
remain meaningful guarantees of individual dignity and
liberty.
- George Bush, President of the United States1
I call upon the people of the United States to honor the legacy
of human rights passed down to us from previous generations
and to resolve that such liberties will prevail in our Nation and
throughout the world.
- George W. Bush, President of the United States2
Adhering to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights is
paramount to achieving the Executive Branch’s determination to
promote human rights throughout the world.  Accordingly, this
requires “progressive measures, national and international, to se-
cure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.”3  There
are many international instruments aimed at establishing human
rights; the United States is a signatory to only a few of them.4
* University of Oregon School of Law, J.D. 2004.  Many thanks to Professors
Ibrahim Gassama, Dom Vetri, Robert Tsai, Steve Sieberson, and Kate Weatherly,
and to Jeni Lassell and Melissa Verhaag.
1 Proclamation 6238-Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human Rights
Week, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2016, 2017 (Dec. 10, 1990) (promising to up-
hold the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights).
2 Proclamation No. 7634, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,667, 76,669 (Dec. 9, 2002).
3 See  G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810. pmbl. (1948).
4 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
[559]
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These well-intentioned human rights conventions and resolutions
remain basically unenforceable, however, leaving enforcement
up to the individual states.5  Domestic measures enforcing basic
human rights standards are therefore essential to the overall de-
velopment of a universal international human rights law.
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)6 is currently at the fore-
front of United States law providing civil redress to victims of
international human rights violations.  Under the ATCA, an in-
ternational law violation is actionable in a U.S. district court as a
tort when committed against an alien.7  Most ATCA interna-
tional law violations are related to human rights abuses, likely
because respect for human rights is a basic tenant of western le-
gal systems and most civilized nations, and it is therefore natural
for the United States to penalize violators of such rights.8  Fur-
thermore, to maintain foreign relations, the United States argua-
bly has a duty to take action when one of its own citizens is
involved in the international law violation.
Enforcing international law violations through a national legal
system raises many novel challenges.  Due to the relatively short
history of ATCA jurisprudence, courts are confronted with many
difficult questions of first impression.  For example, may a U.S.
corporation be held liable under the ATCA for its indirect in-
volvement in human rights abuses and, if so, what is the correct
substantive law to determine liability?
This Comment discusses the ATCA and applies it to a U.S.
corporation in a joint venture with the military government of a
developing nation that uses forced labor in connection with the
establishment of a gas pipeline.  Based on the facts of Doe v.
Unocal Corp. ,9 this Comment argues that once there is subject
2000 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES app. c (2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/app/654pf.htm.
5 For a discussion of the difficulty surrounding the enforcement of international
human rights instruments, see Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of
Human Rights:  The Key Human Rights Challenge:  Developing Enforcement Mecha-
nisms , 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 183 (2002).  States are not bound to enforce
international instruments domestically, but may choose to do so. Id.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
7 “Per se” is used to define cases where the defendant is liable under the ATCA as
the direct perpetrator of the international law violation. See , e.g. , Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 The phrase “international law violations” will be used interchangeably with
“human rights violations” throughout this Comment.  The Universal Declaration on
Human Rights is modeled in large part after the U.S. Bill of Rights.
9 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884-86 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed , 27 F.
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matter jurisdiction, a liability standard for indirect violations of
international law under the ATCA should be adopted from tort
principles embodied in our federal common law.  Furthermore, it
argues that the use of domestic tort principles will likely aid in
the development of an international human rights law without
implicating foreign relations or improperly imposing liability.
Part I of this Comment presents the facts surrounding Unocal’s
relationship with the Myanmar Military.  Part II gives a brief
overview of ATCA jurisprudence.  Part III examines the Unocal
litigation to date.  Part IV interprets the ATCA and then applies
it to the facts of the Unocal  case.  Lastly, this Comment con-
cludes by discussing the benefits of applying domestic law princi-
ples to remedy international law violations under the ATCA and
briefly addresses some of the arguments against that approach.
I
BACKGROUND OF THE UNOCAL LITIGATION
In 1988, an authoritarian military regime, called the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (the Myanmar Military), took
control of Burma and renamed the country Myanmar.10  Since its
overthrow of the Burmese Government, the Myanmar Military
has ruled by decree, without a constitution or legislature, and has
systematically violated human rights.11  Despite attempts at mul-
tiparty elections in which voters overwhelmingly supported the
opposition party, the Myanmar Military—through the use of mil-
itary force—refuses to hand over power.12
The Myanmar Military began its regime by promulgating a for-
Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1988), rev’d in part , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir.
Sept. 18, 2002), reh’g en banc granted , 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Sept. 8,
2003).  As this Comment was going to publication, arguments were heard by the en
banc panel on July 17, 2003.
10 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:  BURMA 2000 (2001), http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/678pf.htm [hereinafter COUNTY RE-PORTS].
In 1997, the junta reorganized itself and changed its name to the State Peace and
Development Council. Id.
11 Id.  (including, but not limited to, extrajudicial killing, torture, rape, forced relo-
cation, and forced labor); see also Unfinished Mission , BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10,
2002, at A26.
12 COUNTY REPORTS, supra , note 10.  In 1990, the opposition party, National
League for Democracy (NLD), commanded more than sixty percent of the popular
vote and eighty percent of the parliamentary seats. Id.  The Myanmar military, how-
ever, constantly imprisons political adversaries. See Myanmar Jails Three Democ-
racy Activists , AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, May 24, 2003, available at  LEXIS, News
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eign investment law to promote the development of a national
economy, a basic principle of which is to attract foreign invest-
ment for the exploitation of natural resources.13  The Myanmar
Military also established Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (My-
anmar Oil), a state-owned enterprise, to run the nation’s oil and
gas exploration and production activities.14  Currently, Myanmar
Oil contracts with thirteen foreign multi-national oil companies,
from eight different countries, to assist in the country’s natural
gas development.15  United States-owned oil companies, how-
ever, are restricted from exporting to Myanmar out of concern
for the country’s human rights record.16  In 1992, a French oil
company, Total, S.A. (Total), entered into a joint venture agree-
ment with Myanmar Oil to construct a gas pipeline through the
Tenasserim region of Myanmar (the Project).17  Under the agree-
ment, the Myanmar Military was responsible for providing labor,
materials, and security, while Total funded, organized, and moni-
tored the project.18  A year after this agreement, and prior to the
U.S. export ban, Unocal, a United States corporation, formally
agreed to participate in the Project.19
In 1996, a group of villagers from the same region of Burma
where the Project was being developed brought a class action suit
against Unocal, Total, Myanmar Oil, the Myanmar Military, and
Library, AFP File; World Briefing Asia:  Myanmar:  Amnesty Reports on First Visit ,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at A12.
13 Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, State Law and Order Restoration
Council Law, No. 10/88 (1988) (Myan.), http://www.energy.gov.mm/Incentive_1.
htm.
14 ENERGY PLANNING DEP’T OF THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MYANMAR OIL AND
GAS ENTERPRISE (2001), at  http://www.energy.gov.mm/MOGE_1.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2003).
15 ENERGY PLANNING DEP’T OF THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MYANMAR OIL AND
GAS ENTERPRISE (2001), at  http://www.energy.gov.mm/MOGE_2.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2003).  The countries operating in Myanmar include Australia, Indonesia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Korea, Malaysia, and France. Id.
16 On May 20, 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13047, which im-
poses three basic prohibitions on transactions with Burma:  (1) it bars all “new”
investment in that country initiated by a U.S. person, including contracts or other
activities for the development of Burmese resources; (2) it prohibits the approval or
other facilitation by a U.S. person of any transaction by a foreign person with Burma
if the transaction would have been prohibited had it been entered into by a U.S.
person directly; (3) the Order voids any action by a U.S. person that evades or
avoids either of the first two prohibitions.  Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg.
28,301 (May 20, 1997).
17 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
18 See id.  at 885.
19 Id. ; see also Exec. Order No. 13047, supra  note 16.
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Unocal’s President and Chief Executive Officer.20  The case was
initiated in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California.21  The villagers alleged that Unocal, through
the Myanmar Military, used—and continues to use—violence
and intimidation to relocate villages, enslave laborers, and steal
property, causing the villagers to suffer forced labor, death of
family members, assault, rape, torture, and the loss of their
homes and property in violation of state, federal, and interna-
tional law.22  The villagers based their claim on the ATCA and
sought monetary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory
relief for the harms they suffered.23  Approximately seven years
have passed since the villagers from Myanmar filed suit, and it is
still uncertain whether the ATCA provides them a remedy for
the egregious human rights abuses they have suffered.
II
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Originally enacted as part of the first Judiciary Act in 1789,24
the ATCA as currently codified provides U.S. district courts with
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”25  Over the statute’s first 191 years, it was
“largely ignored, rarely cited, and relied upon in only two
cases.”26  In 1980, however, the Second Circuit gave the statute
meaning in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ,27 and an era of ATCA juris-
prudence commenced.28  In Filartiga , the court held that torture
20 Id.  at 883.
21 Id.  at 880.
22 Id.  at 883-85.
23 Id.  at 883-834.
24 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
26 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga:  A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations , 27 YALE
J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2002) (citing Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos
v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795)).
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28 In addition to an increase in ATCA claims filed, the decision also set off a wave
of scholarly research primarily into the history and purpose of the ATCA. BETH
STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS 12 (1996).  Most scholars agree that the drafters of the Judiciary Act
considered federal jurisdiction over actions involving aliens to be very important for
the following two reasons:  (1) it was generally thought that actions involving aliens
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perpetrated under the color of state authority violates interna-
tional law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.29
The Filartiga  decision was groundbreaking in the development
of the ATCA in two respects.  First, the decision defined interna-
tional law for ATCA purposes not as it was at the time of the
statute’s passage, but rather “as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today.”30  Relying on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s instruction that international law is derived, in the ab-
sence of controlling authority, by consulting the works of jurists
and commentators,31 the court concluded—after consulting pri-
marily the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—that torture
is universally condemned and therefore prohibited by interna-
tional law.32  The court further stated that “international law con-
fers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own
governments”; the scope of which is a “subject for continuing re-
finement and elaboration.”33  This statement reinforces the state-
centeredness of international law and allows international law
under the ATCA to develop as certain forms of conduct become
universally condemned.34
Second, the Filartiga  decision suggests that the ATCA pro-
vides a substantive right to a tort action under federal law upon
would tend to affect foreign affairs; and (2) federal jurisdiction was necessary to
hold the United States, and its citizens, responsible for injuring aliens.  An alien
could be denied justice if the state failed to “provide redress for an injury inflicted
on the alien by some private person—for example, a failure of the state to provide
judicial remedies to an alien on whom physical or economic injury has been inflicted
by a resident of the state.”  Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Law Claims:  Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute , in THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT:  AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 175, 179-86 (Ralph G. Steinhardt &
Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999) (quoting L. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
685-87 (1980)).
29 Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 878.
30 Id . at 881.
31 Id . at 880-81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
32 Id . at 884.  The court also considered various treaties, national constitutions,
and U.S. policy to support its holding. Id .  Under the ATCA, the “law of nations,”
as currently understood, consists of “universal, obligatory, and definable” norms.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
33 Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 885.
34 Since Filartiga , ATCA violations of international law now include genocide,
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995); cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril,
901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1994); summary execution, Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at
184; arbitrary detention, id .; causing disappearance, Forti , 694 F. Supp. at 709-11;
and war crimes, id. ; Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front FIS, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C.
1998).
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the showing of a violation of international law.35  This right is
evidenced in the court’s statement that the ATCA is construed
“not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the
federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized
by international law.”36  The Second Circuit reasoned that, under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Congress may vest federal
courts with subject matter jurisdiction over international law vio-
lations because international law has always been part of federal
common law.37  The court’s assessment that international law has
the status of federal common law is significant because it ac-
knowledges the existence of a specific body of federal common
law and authorizes federal courts to develop the law in that
area.38  This interpretation has generally been followed by
courts39 and even has the endorsement of Congress.40
In a later ATCA decision, the Second Circuit in Kadic v.
Karadzic  extended the scope of the ATCA to private actors.41  In
Kadic , the defendant argued that international law binds only
states and persons acting under the color of a state’s law, not
private actors.42  The court held that a private person may be lia-
35 630 F.2d at 880-887. See also  Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations
of International Human Rights Awarded by U.S. Courts , in THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT, supra  note 28, at 291-92.
36 Filartiga , 630 F.2d. at 887.
37 Id . at 885-87.
38 International law as federal common law is supported by the need for federal
control over international relations and foreign affairs.  This interpretation is termed
the “modern position.”  Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:  Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Law After Erie , 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 394 (1997). See
also  Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? , 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824 (1998).  For a critique of this interpretation, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of
the Modern Position,  110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
39 See , e.g. , Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic , 70
F.3d at 236; Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994). But see
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also
Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability:  Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic
Litigation , 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 405 (2001).
40 ATCA “claims based on torture or summary execution do not exhaust the list
of actions that may appropriately be covered be [sic] section 1350.  That statute
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.”  Torture Victim Pre-
vention Act of 1991, H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1992), reprinted in  1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
41 70 F.3d 232, 236 (1995).
42 Id.  at 239.  This is the state action requirement under the ATCA. See id.  at 239-
40.  The status of the individual under international law has been debated for centu-
ries.  Initially, the law of nations was universally binding on all mankind.  The classi-
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ble under the ATCA for violating international law because “the
law of nations, as understood in the modern era, [does not con-
fine] its reach to state action” and “certain forms of conduct vio-
late the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under
the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”43  The
court relied on the historical application of international law, ex-
ecutive branch support, and the position of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States in ap-
plying universal international law to a private actor.44  Prior to
Kadic , a private actor was immune from ATCA jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Kadic  court’s recognition that certain interna-
tional law violations apply to private actors is significant because
it allows future ATCA plaintiffs who allege universal interna-
tional law violations to circumvent the private/public actor
debate.45
Over the past twenty-three years, the ATCA has been used
with increased frequency against direct perpetrators of human
rights abuses.46  These cases typically involve state officials who
commit human rights violations while acting under the color of
law, then subsequently leave their positions and can be found in
the jurisdiction of the United States.47  A few cases have even
extended liability up the chain of command to officers for human
rights violations committed by those subject to their command.48
In one ATCA case, claims were made against a U.S. corporation
operating during World War II that directly employed slave la-
bor.49  All of these cases reaffirm the notion that a defendant
cal view, however, is that international law governs the relationship among states,
not individuals.  Marc Rosen, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act:  A Policy Solution , 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 469-
72 (1998).
43 Kadic , 70 F.3d at 239.  These certain forms of conduct refer to jus cogens
norms, which are defined as “peremptory norms of general international law ac-
cepted” and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
norms from which no derogation is permitted.  Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 53 U.N.T.S. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99; see also  Alan Freder-
ick Enslen, Filartiga’s Offspring:  The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope
of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV.
695, 723 n.166 (1997).
44 Kadic , 70 F.3d at 239-41.
45 See  Enslen, supra  note 43, at 702.
46 Collingsworth, supra  note 5, at 188.
47 See, e.g. , Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-80 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
supra  note 7.
48 See, e.g. , Kadic , 70 F.3d 232.
49 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32 (D.N.J. 1999).  For a full
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who is the direct perpetrator of a universal international law vio-
lation may be held liable per se under the ATCA.  When the de-
fendant is not the direct perpetrator or commander of the
international law violation, however, it is difficult to hold the de-
fendant responsible under the same per se standard of liability.
This difficulty lies at the heart of properly applying the ATCA to
the facts of Unocal  and is evidenced in the various opinions
handed down in the litigation to date.
III
THE Unocal  Litigation
Over the past seven years, there have been three decisions and
four differing views regarding how the law should judge Unocal’s
actions.  Although Unocal did not directly employ the use of
slave labor, the company is arguably liable to some degree for its
relationship with the Myanmar Military and for its knowledge of
human rights abuses being carried out in furtherance of the pro-
ject.  Yet, the novelty of the issue and lack of precedent in this
area make it difficult to determine whether Unocal’s actions rise
to a level that justifies imposing civil liability on the company.
For these reasons, it should not seem too uncharacteristic for the
confusion among the district and appellate court decisions.
In 1997, in the first of two district court decisions, the District
Court for the Central District of California dismissed the claims
against the Myanmar Military and Myanmar Oil under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA);50 in 1998, the court dis-
missed the claims against Total for lack of personal jurisdiction.51
However, the court found that subject matter jurisdiction was
available under the ATCA against the Unocal defendants.52  In-
terpreting the ATCA to require “(1) a claim by an alien, (2) al-
leging a tort, and (3) a violation of international law,” the court
held that the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to prove that Unocal
committed a violation of international law.53  The court reasoned
that the villagers’ allegations that the Unocal defendants “were
discussion of this case and other similar cases from the Nuremberg Military Tribunal,
see Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity:  From Nuremberg to Rangoon An Ex-
amination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations , 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91 (2002).
50 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884-88 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
51 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
52 Unocal , 963 F. Supp. at 884.
53 Id.  at 890-91.
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and are jointly engaged with the state officials in the challenged
activity, namely forced labor and other human rights violations in
furtherance of the . . . project” satisfied the state action require-
ment and therefore were sufficient to support subject matter ju-
risdiction.54  Moreover, the court reasoned that Unocal could be
liable for slave labor even absent state action, because certain
violations of international law do not require state action.55  For
example, Unocal paid the Myanmar Military to provide labor
and security for the project, “essentially treating [the Myanmar
Military] as an overseer, accepting the benefit of and approving
the use of forced labor.”56  Finally, the court dismissed Unocal’s
act of state argument57 because it was not apparent that adjudi-
cating this matter would affect U.S. foreign relations with My-
anmar, since the executive branch had already denounced
Myanmar’s human rights abuses.58  This initial district court deci-
sion was the first to acknowledge that a U.S. corporation may be
held liable for a violation of international law for its indirect in-
volvement in human rights abuses.
In 2000, under a different presiding judge,59 the same Califor-
nia district court granted Unocal’s motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that the plaintiffs could not show that Unocal was
liable for the Myanmar Military’s international law violations.60
The court analyzed Unocal’s liability as both a state actor and as
a private party.61  Relying on state action, as defined by section
1983 of the United States Code,62 the court found that Unocal
could not be held directly liable for an international law violation
54 Id.  at 891.
55 Id.  (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
56 Id.  at 892.
57 Id.  at 893-94 (explaining that the act of state doctrine precludes courts from
sitting in judgment of the actions of other states when foreign affairs are implicated).
58 Id.  at 893.
59 The original district court judge in the Unocal  case is now seated on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Appellate Counsellor Profiles:  Profile of Judge Richard A.
Paez , at  http://www.appellate-counsellor.com/profiles/paez/htm.
60 Doe v. Unocal Corp, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
61 Id.  at 1305-10.
62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  This section allows private individuals to bring civil
suits against state actors for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Id.  Furthermore, a
private individual is considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983 if one of the
following four judicial tests can be satisfied:  public function, state compulsion,
nexus, or joint action.  Lugar v. Edmonton Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).  Under
this test, the unlawful conduct must be fairly attributable to the state. Unocal , 110 F.
Supp. 2d at 1305-07.
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because it was not a state actor.63  Furthermore, the court held
that Unocal could not be held liable as a private actor because it
did not actively participate in forced labor.64
Confronted with conflicting district court decisions, the Ninth
Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ appeal with respect to the forced
labor issue and reversed the district court’s prior decision.65  Al-
though all three judges agreed that state action was not required
and that Unocal could be held liable for the abuses committed by
the Myanmar Military, the judges disagreed primarily over what
substantive law should provide the appropriate liability stan-
dard.66  The majority opinion began by concluding as a threshold
matter that an international law violation existed because forced
labor—and other torts committed in pursuit thereof—is a mod-
ern variant of slavery.67  The court defined forced labor as a jus
cogens  violation, which allowed it to bypass the ATCA’s state
action requirement.68  With the state action requirement out of
the way, the majority held that Unocal could be liable under the
ATCA for “aid[ing] and abett[ing] the Myanmar Military in sub-
jecting [Plaintiffs] to forced labor.”69  Through the same analysis,
the court concluded that Unocal could be found liable under the
same standard for murder and rape, but not torture.70  The aiding
and abetting standard adopted by the majority was drawn from
international law after the court went through a choice of law
analysis.71  Next, the majority applied international aiding and
abetting, which it defined as “knowing practical assistance or en-
couragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
the crime,”72 to Unocal’s actions and held that a reasonable per-
63 Unocal , 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07.
64 Id.  at 1309-10.  The court adopted the active participation standard from the
Nuremburg Military Tribunal cases.
65 Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *3
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (the Ninth Circuit consolidated two ATCA cases involving
Unocal and villagers from Myanmar).
66 Id.  at *84.
67 Id.  at *32 (citing Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) for
the proposition that the ATCA provides for relief if the plaintiff can demonstrate “a
violation of ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ international norms”).
68 Id.  at *32. Jus cogens  is a mandatory norm of general international law binding
on a nation regardless of whether it chooses to recognize it. Id.  at *40; see also
supra  text accompanying note 43.
69 Id.  at *35-36.
70 Id.  at *58.
71 Id.  at *41.
72 Id.  at *35-36, *57.
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son could find that Unocal’s action met this standard and sum-
mary judgment was therefore inappropriate.73  Additionally, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the villagers’ claims against the
Myanmar Military and Myanmar Oil under the FSIA and deter-
mined that the villagers’ claims were not barred against Unocal
by the act of state doctrine.74
On the other hand, the concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit
decision disagreed with the majority’s decision to adopt a liability
standard from international law, and suggested that “traditional
civil tort principles embodied in federal common law, rather than
[evolving] standards of international law,” should provide the
standard.75  The concurrence relied on federal common law as an
appropriate basis for its rationale because federal common law is
applied in limited circumstances when authorized by Congress.76
The concurrence then went through the same choice of law anal-
ysis as the majority, but came to a different conclusion.77  The
concurrence’s choice-of-law inquiry pointed to federal common
law as the appropriate body of substantive law to apply, whereas
the majority’s choice-of-law analysis led to international law.78
The concurrence also offered and applied three possible liability
standards—joint venture, agency, and reckless disregard—and
concluded that there was ample evidence to support each.79  The
approach taken by the concurrence highlights yet another way of
interpreting and applying the ATCA in the Unocal  case.
In February 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the three-judge
panel decision and decided to rehear the case en banc to deter-
mine the proper substantive law and legal standard to judge
Unocal’s actions.80  The varying opinions, both at the district
court and appellate court levels, likely influenced the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision to rehear the case en banc.  More importantly, the
conflicting opinions illustrate the difficulties of correctly inter-
preting and applying the ATCA under unique factual settings.
73 Id.  at *36.
74 Id.  at *63-64, *77.
75 Id.  at *85.
76 Id.  at *84-97.
77 Id.
78 Id.  at 98-101.
79 Id.
80 Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2003).
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IV
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE ATCA
Once a federal court establishes jurisdiction, the ATCA autho-
rizes courts to “fashion domestic common law remedies to give
effect to violations of customary international law.”81  Jurisdic-
tion under the ATCA is established upon the existence of:  (1) a
claim by an alien; (2) alleging a tort; and (3) in violation of inter-
national law.82  Essentially, the latter two elements of the statute
are merged into a so-called “international tort,”83 and jurisdic-
tion under the ATCA therefore requires no more than an allega-
tion of a violation of international law.84  Under this construction
of the statute, jurisdiction in the Unocal case is appropriate be-
cause slave labor is a violation of universal international law.85
Because jurisdiction is based on the actions of the Myanmar Mili-
tary, however, Unocal’s liability as a third party under the ATCA
raises important questions of first impression.86  First, what is the
appropriate body of law to determine whether Unocal may be
held liable under the ATCA for the international law violation
committed by the Myanmar Military?  Second, having consulted
this source of law, what circumstances, if any, give rise to liabil-
ity?  This section argues that federal common law and well-estab-
81 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); see also  Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)
(stating that “the substantive right on which this [ATCA] action is based must be
found in the domestic tort law of the United States”).
82 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).  For an alternative interpretation of
the requisite jurisdictional requirements, see Randall, supra  note 28.  The author
suggests that a plaintiff must show a violation of international law and a separate
municipal tort to sustain jurisdiction under the ATCA. Id.  at 195-200.  This inter-
pretation would eliminate the need to search for a third-party liability standard
under the ATCA because the defendant would be held directly liable for the inter-
national law violation through a municipal tort.
83 BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
U.S. COURTS 50-54 (1996).
84 Abebe-Jira , 72 F.3d at 847.
85 Presumably, the ATCA does not require the defendant to be the actual perpe-
trator of the international law violations.  Furthermore, the ATCA’s state action
requirement is either satisfied through the action of the Myanmar Military or is not
required because slave labor is a jus cogens  violation.  It is therefore unnecessary to
meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See  Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-
56603, 00-57197, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *32 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002); see
also supra  text accompanying note 40.
86 There is not yet a consensus in either the cases or the literature as to the law
that governs various issues raised in ATCA litigation. See STEPHENS & RATNER,
supra  note 28.
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lished domestic tort principles should determine whether Unocal
is liable for the human rights abuses suffered by the Myanmar
villagers.87  Once it is established that federal common law is the
appropriate source, there are a variety of liability standards to
choose from.  This Comment adopts a “reckless disregard stan-
dard” as the proper standard for measuring liability.
The proposition that federal common law should govern Uno-
cal’s liability under the ATCA is mandated by the modern posi-
tion’s interpretation of the statute, the purpose and policy behind
the statute, and the sources of law available to the court.  If one
accepts the modern position’s interpretation of the ATCA—that
the statute grants a right to sue—federal common law is the ap-
plicable source of law to determine whether Unocal may be held
liable for the human rights abuses committed by the Myanmar
Military.88  In that case, federal courts may develop federal com-
mon law, absent congressional authority, and “apply such law ‘in
such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obliga-
tions of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with
foreign nations, and admiralty cases.’”89  One such narrow area
87 This argument is adopted, in large part, from the approach taken by the concur-
rence in the three-judge panel Ninth Circuit decision. Unocal , 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at *84 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also Abebe-Jira , 72 F.3d at 848.
Although there is no general federal common law, federal law governs suits affecting
international relations and is the interpretive source for international law issues. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964).  For a discussion
of the arguments for applying international law, see Michael Dwayne Pettyjohn,
Comment, “Bring Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Egregious Torts Yearning To See
Green:”  The Alien Tort Statute , 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 513, 546-48 (2003).
According to this approach, the following reasons support applying international
law:  (1) domestic tort law is often inadequate in addressing human rights abuses; (2)
applying domestic tort law would reduce the grave international law aspect of the
tort to no more than a garden-variety municipal tort; (3) federal courts are able to
fashion a remedy from an amorphous body of international law, as they have suc-
cessfully in the past; and (4) federal courts would be allowed “to develop a uniform
federal common law response to international law. . . .” Id.  (citing Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 162, 182 (D. Mass. 1995)).
88 See supra  note 35 and accompanying text; see also STEPHENS & RATNER, supra
note 28, at 120.  If, however, one interprets the statute as a jurisdictional grant only,
the controlling body of law is arguably international law supplemented by federal
common law where international law is incomplete. Id.  On the other hand, if the
ATCA is only a forum-shifting statute for transitory torts, similar to a diversity juris-
diction statute, the applicable law would be determined by looking at the forum
state’s choice of law rules. Id.
89 Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. 19263, at *92-93 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE207.txt unknown Seq: 15  1-MAR-04 13:31
Searching for a Corporate Liability Standard 573
given the status of federal common law is international law, be-
cause it naturally implicates U.S. relations with foreign states.90
Furthermore, Congress traditionally enacts statutes that grant
federal courts jurisdiction over a particular class of cases while
leaving the courts the task of fashioning remedies that effectuate
the federal policies underlying the statute.91  In such cases,
“courts should apply federal common law ‘to fill the interstices of
federal legislation.’”92  Although it is clear that Congress’ enact-
ment of the ATCA was intended to make a violation of interna-
tional law a federal tort,93 the ATCA is silent as to what
circumstances give rise to tort liability.  In the ATCA cases to
date, imposing liability has been straightforward; courts have
held direct violators of international law liable per se under the
statute by simply referencing the international law violation.94
Since Unocal is not the direct perpetrator of the human rights
abuses, the per se approach proves unworkable and it is there-
fore necessary to adopt some other liability standard to remedy
the international law violation.  The applicable source to find
such a standard is federal common law.
Although a standard may hypothetically be drawn from inter-
national law because international law is a part of our federal
common law,95 there is a difference between substituting interna-
tional law for federal common law and using international law
properly as a part of federal common law.96  If the court were to
adopt an international standard in the Unocal  case, as in the dis-
trict court’s second decision and the majority in the three-panel
Ninth Circuit decision, it would essentially displace “traditional
civil tort principles embodied in federal common law” with
“evolving standards of international law, such as nascent criminal
law doctrine recently adopted by an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal.”97  Additionally, only international legal principles that
90 Id. ; see Sabbatino , 376 U.S. at 421-27.
91 Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *93-94 (citing Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100-04 (1972)); Abebe-Jira , 72 F.3d at 848 (citing Textile Work-
ers of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)).
92 Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. 19263, at *93 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods,
440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979)).
93 Id.  at *93-94.
94 See , e.g. , Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
95 See supra  text accompanying note 38.
96 Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *96.
97 Id.  at *90.  Both the “international aiding and abetting” and “active participa-
tion” standards were drawn from international law. Id.
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achieve sufficient international acceptance constitute interna-
tional law and become part of the federal common law.98  Cur-
rently, no third-party civil liability standard has achieved
international acceptance, which is evidenced by the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reliance on an international criminal aiding and abetting
standard.99  This aiding and abetting standard has yet to attain
international acceptance; rather, it is a standard adopted by only
two international criminal tribunals.100  Similarly, Myanmar law
does not provide a civil or criminal remedy for violations of in-
ternational law.  Failing to adopt a standard from federal com-
mon law and relying on less than adequate international
standards or non-existent Myanmar legal standards would frus-
trate the goals of the ATCA because aliens who suffer interna-
tional law violations would be denied access to justice and the
international law violation would not be properly remedied.  In
order to achieve the goals of the ATCA, a liability standard must
therefore come from well-established domestic tort principles
embodied in U.S. federal common law.
Furthermore, drawing an ATCA corporate liability standard
from federal common law in the Unocal  litigation is supported
by consideration of the relevant factors in a choice-of-law analy-
sis.101  First, the needs of the international system point to Uno-
cal’s domicile in order to promote consistent treatment of U.S.
companies that contribute to violations of international law.
Moreover, as mentioned above, federal common law is better sit-
uated to provide tort remedies under the ATCA than either in-
ternational law or the law of Myanmar.  Tort law is a traditional
common law remedy over which state and federal courts have
had a long history developing.  Second, the United States also
98 Id.  at *104.
99 See id.  at *36-49.
100 Id.  (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in
38 I.L.M. 317 (1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T (Jan. 27, 2000), available
at  http://www.ictr.org).
101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971), which pro-
vides the following factors to be considered in a choice-of-law analysis:  the needs of
the interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the rele-
vant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; the protection of justified expectations; the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.  The Filartiga  court suggested that the approach developed in Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1954), provides the correct choice-of-law analysis.  Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980).
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has “a significant interest in deterring risky behavior by domicil-
iaries who cross the border to take advantage of other states [sic]
law, and generally has an interest in deterring negligent conduct
by its [corporate citizens], wherever that conduct may occur.”102
Third, adopting a corporate liability standard from federal com-
mon law protects the justified expectations of both the parties.
The Myanmar villagers have a justified expectation to be free
from forced labor because it is a universal right, regardless of
whether the Myanmar Military chooses to recognize it.103  Addi-
tionally, although there is no precedent for third party liability
for torts committed abroad under the ATCA, federal common
law has traditionally subjected its corporate citizens to well-
known third party liability tort doctrines.104  Fourth, the basic
policy underlying ATCA jurisprudence is to remedy interna-
tional law violations, which is best achieved by applying well-de-
veloped tort principles.105  Fifth, applying these principles
furthers the “ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied” because U.S. courts are well-versed in applying
common law tort principles.106  Finally, “certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result” are more likely to be attained by resort-
ing to U.S. law because of the extensive precedent upon which to
draw.107  Based on the foregoing choice-of-law analysis, federal
common law is the most appropriate substantive law to apply.
A. A Third Party Liability Standard under the ATCA
Having ascertained that federal common law is the appropriate
source of law to find a corporate liability standard, the next step
is to adopt a standard that furthers the purpose and policies of
the ATCA.  Since the ATCA seeks to remedy international law
violations through tort actions in federal courts, whichever stan-
dard is chosen should meet the goals of tort law and conform to
tort principles.108  At the very least, a corporate liability standard
should require some fault on the part of the corporation rather
102 EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.57 (3d ed. 2000).
103 See supra  text accompanying note 40.
104 Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *99.
105 Id . at *98.
106 Id.  at 100 (quoting In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir.
2002)).
107 Id.
108 The function of tort law is to compensate individuals for losses they have suf-
fered within the scope of their legally recognized interest.  Tort law “is concerned
with the allocation of losses arising out of human activities.” PROSSER & KEETON
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than mere vicarious liability.109  This would allow corporations to
weigh the risk of investment against the risk of liability based on
their knowledge of the abuses being committed and their role in
furthering those abuses.  Federal common law offers a variety of
options.
Since the international community has come to recognize the
common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human
rights,110 a corporate liability standard under the ATCA based on
the common law “reckless disregard” principle seems fitting.
The reckless disregard standard consists of two elements:  (1) the
defendant’s conduct must not only create a foreseeable risk of
harm to others, it must create a high degree of risk of serious
harm; and (2) the defendant must have knowledge of the risk and
proceed without concern for the safety of others.111  A prima fa-
cie reckless disregard case in the ATCA context would require
both that the defendant have actual knowledge that one’s con-
duct creates a high risk of the occurrence of an egregious human
rights abuse and that the defendant must proceed irrespective of
that risk without concern for the human rights of others.
B. Unocal under the Reckless Disregard Standard
Applying the reckless disregard standard to the Unocal  case,
there remains an issue of material fact regarding whether Uno-
cal’s conduct meets this standard.  A reasonable juror could find
that Unocal knew that the Myanmar Military would engage in
human rights abuses, including forced labor, in connection with
the Project, and Unocal consciously disregarded those risks in
pursuit of profit without concern for the human rights of the My-
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]. .
109 Under any theory of vicarious liability, commonly referred to by its Latin
name, respondeat superior , a defendant is held liable for the wrong of another per-
son in a strict liability sense because liability is based on the relationship rather than
individual fault.  Adopting a vicarious liability standard would subject corporations
to strict liability for the actions of governments with whom they have a relationship,
which would raise a host of implications that are beyond the scope of this Comment.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333 (2000).  “‘The commonest test of a
relationship to which the law attaches vicarious liability is control, or general right of
control.’” DOMINICK VETRI, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.06, at 507-08 (2d ed.
2002) (quoting 5 HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY § 26.3, at 10-11).  Since it is highly un-
likely that a corporation could control the conduct of a government entity, any vica-
rious liability theory is impracticable.
110 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
111 DOBBS, supra  note 109, at § 27; PROSSER & KEETON, supra  note 108, § 34.
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anmar villagers.112  The reckless disregard standard comports
with the purpose and policies of the ATCA.  It provides a rem-
edy, which would otherwise be unavailable, to victims of human
rights abuses in violation of international law, and ensures that
U.S. entities are held accountable for violating a universal stan-
dard of care.  Using the reckless disregard standard to enforce
human rights domestically fulfills the goals of tort law as well,
namely by compensating victims of human rights abuses and allo-
cating the costs to those who are liable and have the best ability
to pay and account for the risks.  In the Unocal  case, for exam-
ple, the threat of a billion dollar suit has not persuaded Unocal to
divest from the project.113  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that Unocal has weighed the risks and has proceeded irrespective
of these risks because it believes profits from the project will be
greater than any potential damage award.  For these reasons, cor-
porate liability under the ATCA should be based on the reckless
disregard for human rights.
In short, the interpretation, purpose, and policies of the ATCA
require that federal common law provide the corporate liability
standard to judge Unocal’s conduct.  Traditional common law
tort principles offer the best means for remedying international
law violations when the defendant is not the actual perpetrator,
but rather a culpable third party.  A reckless disregard for human
rights standard will contribute to the development of both do-
mestic enforcement of international law violations under the
ATCA and a universal human rights law.
CONCLUSION
Any decision in the Unocal  case will have serious implications
in the field of human rights and will significantly shape the future
of ATCA jurisprudence.  Since Unocal  is at the forefront of any
ATCA litigation involving a defendant corporation, most on-
lookers are watching intently.  The ATCA currently leads the
way in enforcing international human rights domestically and of-
fers an avenue to extend civil liability to those who flagrantly
disregard basic human rights abroad.  If the Ninth Circuit adopts
a standard under the ATCA that imposes liability on corpora-
112 See  Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at
*119-20 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
113 Unocal Affirms Commitment to Myanmar; Asia Central to Strategy , INT’L OIL
DAILY, Oct. 21, 2003, available at  LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
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tions that recklessly disregard basic human rights in pursuit of
profit, as it should, the United States’ determination and purpose
to uphold human rights will be furthered.
Adopting an ATCA corporate liability standard will also aid
the development of an international human rights law considera-
bly.  It is well established that “general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations” are a source of international law.114
These general principles of national law may be consulted as an
independent source of law when there is not sufficient practice
by states to give the particular principle the status of customary
international law and when the principle has not been legislated
by general international agreement.115  Essentially, general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations create the founda-
tion of international law.  The core rights guaranteed by
international human rights law, for example, resemble the rights
protected by the United States Constitution.116  Another exam-
ple of international law rooted in national law is the criminal aid-
ing and abetting standard adopted and applied by the majority in
the most recent Ninth Circuit decision in Unocal .117  Therefore,
domestic recognition of corporate liability for flagrantly disre-
garding human rights will likely lead to similar international rec-
ognition118 and therefore contribute to the development of
international human rights law.
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102
reporters’ note 1 (1987) (quoting I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 38(1)(c).
115 Id.  cmt. l.
116 See  Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States
Double Standard , 1 GREEN BAG 2d 365, 366 (1998).  The United States law has
played a dominant role in creating foundational international human rights instru-
ments such as the Nuremberg Charter, the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration, and the Genocide treaty. Id.
117 See Unocal , 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *35-36.
118 This is not to say that the adoption of a corporate liability standard by the
United States alone will further the development of international law, but rather
that international law development will be furthered if multiple countries adopt such
a standard. See  Craig Forcese, Deterring “Militarized Commerce”:  The Prospect of
Liability for “Privatized” Human Rights Abuses,  31 OTTAWA L. REV. 171, 210 (1999-
2000).  A Canadian company could face a viable common law tort action in Cana-
dian courts for its relationship with a foreign military government. Id. ; see also  An-
dré Nollkaemper, Public International Law in Transitional Litigation Against
Multinational Corporations:  Prospects and Problems in the Courts of the Nether-
lands , in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTER-NATIONAL
LAW (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).  Dutch civil tort law
holds defendants liable for their activities that violate a standard of care, interpreted
with reference to international law. Id.
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This benefit greatly outweighs any of the arguments advanced
against applying the ATCA to U.S. corporations.119  First, it has
been suggested that adopting a corporate liability standard under
the ATCA “threatens to interfere with U.S. government foreign
policy prerogatives and could impose liability on companies for
becoming involved in projects that are permitted under U.S.
law.”120  Nothing could be further from the truth, however, espe-
cially under the facts of Unocal .  Holding U.S. corporations lia-
ble for their reckless disregard of the human rights of aliens
would only improve U.S. foreign relations and standing in the
international community.  One of the underlying premises of the
ATCA is to provide aliens with access to justice for wrongs com-
mitted by U.S. citizens out of concern for maintaining foreign
relations.  It is therefore imperative for U.S. courts to impose lia-
bility against its own citizens under the ATCA where justified.
Furthermore, U.S. corporations have traditionally been sub-
jected to liability for domestic conduct permitted under U.S. law.
Thus, it should make no difference simply because liability arises
from actions occurring abroad.
Next, it has been argued that imposing liability on U.S. corpo-
rations through the ATCA fails to guide future corporate behav-
ior because corporations “will be unable to fully determine what
[they] may and may not be liable for. . . .”121  By relying on tradi-
tional tort principles found in federal common law, however, this
argument fails because:
[T]ort rules governing conduct to a large extent reflect social
values and norms already in existence in the culture.  They do
not create new standards imposed by authoritarian judges;
they merely enforce what society already believes.  This view
also explains why tort rules can be announced after the dis-
pute arises; they do not invent a new standard and impose it
119 The author’s attempt here is to highlight and briefly address some of the argu-
ments being advanced against imposing ATCA liability on U.S. corporations.
120 Edwin V. Woodsome, Attorney for Unocal, Presentation at the Loyola Law
School International Law Symposium (Feb. 8, 2003), available at  http://
www.unocal.com/myanmar/woodsome.htm; see also  Demian Betz, Holding Multina-
tional Corporations Responsible for Human Rights Abuses Committed by Security
Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations:  An Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdic-
tion for the Purpose of Regulating Corporate Behavior Abroad , 14 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 163 (2001) (arguing that imposing such liability on U.S. companies amounts to a
de facto trade regulation); see also  Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International
Human Rights Litigation , 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 460 (2001) (admitting that costs to
U.S. foreign relations are difficult to measure).
121 Woodsome, supra  note 120.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE207.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-MAR-04 13:31
580 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
on past conduct but resolve disputes about events in the past
in the light of standards we generally share but perhaps have
not fully articulated.  So in a sense it is not tort rules that we
expect to shape conduct.  The tort rule confirms or articulates
social ideals and perhaps reinforces them by imposing
liability.122
Tort law imposes liability upon socially undesirable conduct.
Since respect for basic human rights is universally required, the
“we didn’t know” argument is unavailing to corporations that
recklessly disregard those rights.
If the United States is intent on upholding human rights and
promoting the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, courts should subject those who consciously disregard
human rights to liability, including corporations.  Adopting a
reckless disregard standard from federal common law under the
ATCA is the next step “in the fulfillment of the ageless dream”
toward a universal international human rights law.123
122 DOBBS, supra  note 109, § 16.
123 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
